9. Summary of Work
Ostrom explains that Rational Choice Theory assumes that humans are self-interested, maximizers. Her research argues that Rational Choice has been successful in predicting marginal behavior in competitive decision making but when it comes to using this theory to predict decisions that are made during social dilemmas it has proved to be ineffective. Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical events causing change in multiple disciplines motivate a need to develop the choice of rational choice models to be used as an establishment for the study of social dilemmas and cooperative exploit.
After an preface to the dilemma of triumph over social dilemmas through collective action, the leftovers of this article is divided into six sections which include notional calculation of currently established rational choice theory related to community dilemmas, challenges to the sole reliance, experimental findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are "better than rational", the possibility of increasing second-generation models of rationality, an initial theoretical scenario, implications of placing reciprocity, repute, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of cooperative action.
The allusion of developing second-generation models of empirically grounded, bloodedly rational, and moral decision making are substantial. New research questions will open up. We need to expand the type of research methods regularly used in political science. We need to increase the level of understanding among those engaged in formal theory, experimental research, and field research across the social and biological sciences.
10. Summary of Work
Blais strengthens his argument by pointing out that rational choice authors have admitted a problem with exist voting and rational choice perspective because voting is a paradox of irrational response.
Blais uses Green and Shapiro's infamous critique of the Rational Choice Theory to compare his verdict of the actual role Rational Choice plays in one's decision to vote. Green and Shapiro's research blatantly stated the Rational Choice Model had failed to contribute any advancement of the empirical study of politics. Blais's verdict is not as harsh and contrary to his colleagues' findings. Blais uses a strong example to prove his point stating that motivations that make people vote, such as civic duty, are far from Rational Choice that claims people are self-interested. Since most citizens vote despite even when it is not in their best personal interests to do so is a fascination that only Rational Choice Theory can explain.
