通过对霍布斯的主权理论进行一系列的修改来讨论洛克是最容易的。当然，这两种理论之间的差异要复杂得多，但就论文而言，足以确定三个密切相关的关键差异。首先，洛克驳斥了霍布斯的主张(我已经多次证明这是自相矛盾的)，即臣民在从自然状态过渡到主权状态时，实际上放弃了判断其主权的权利和能力。实际上，洛克使契约成为一种双向的协议，而不是一种单向的服从，在他的著作中被称为第十三章的“受托权”。其次，对洛克来说，“最终”的主权永远在于人民。一方面，至高无上的君主永远是上帝，但在他的宝座之下，人们可以相互授权，但永远不会有一个永久的权力等级制度。立法机关的最高权力是人民有条件地授予的;每个人都受其法律的约束，尽管存在分歧。通过这种逻辑的延伸，洛克对他的主权概念提出了两个基本的主张，霍布斯没有采纳:一是没有主权政府的一部分会凌驾于法律之上,另一个是权力随时可以从政府收回,等待协议的人(这些推导详细探讨在第八章和第九章),第三,也许最重要的是,不同的是,霍布斯,主权是一个永恒的,不可分割的权利属于一个特定的个体。事实上，这一分歧正是本文的症结所在。对洛克来说，保护公共利益需要各种各样的权力，就像霍布斯一样，但没有必要把它们统一在一个整体上。在这里洛克提出了法律主权本身的概念:“没有必要，立法应该始终存在，而不是总是有事情要做”。法律“具有持续不断的力量，需要永久的执行”，这是由行政权力提供的。虽然霍布斯同意主权的这些方面的需要，但他拒绝分裂它们。另一方面，洛克证明了“劳动分工”的存在是可行的，特别是因为他提到了一种与其他职责相关的自然权力的概念。联邦权力，涉及“战争与和平的权力，联盟与联盟，以及所有交易”，可以很容易地投资于完全独立于行政和立法权力的机构。
加拿大代写作业:霍布斯的主权理论
It is easiest to discuss Locke by making a series of modifications on Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. Of course, the difference between the two theories is far more complicated, but in regards to the thesis, it is sufficient to identify three very closely-related, key differences. First, Locke dismisses Hobbes’s assertion (which I have showed to be contradictory multiple times) that subjects give up the right, in fact, the ability, to judge their sovereign when moving from the state of nature to sovereignty. Effectively, Locke makes the contract a two-way agreement instead of a one-way subjection, termed in his works as “fiduciary power” in Chapter XIII. Second, for Locke, ‘ultimate’ sovereignty resides always in the people. One on hand, the supreme sovereign will always be God, but beneath his throne, men can delegate power to one another, but there will never be a permanent hierarchy of power. The supreme power of the legislature is amassed from a conditional grant by the people; every man is bound by its laws, notwithstanding disagreement. By extension of this logic, Locke makes two foundational claims of his notion of sovereignty, which Hobbes does not adopt: one is that no part of the sovereign government will ever be above the law, the other is that power can be retracted from the government at any time, pending agreement of the people (these derivations are explored in detail in Chapters VIII and IX).The third and, perhaps most important, difference is that for Hobbes, sovereignty is a perpetual, indivisible power belonging to a particular individual. Indeed, this disagreement is the crux of this paper. For Locke, there are a variety of powers necessary for the protection of the public good, just as in Hobbes, but there is no need to unite them all in one body. Here Locke presents idea of the sovereignty of law itself: “there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do” (Locke 76). The laws “have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution” that is provided by the executive power (Locke 76). While Hobbes agrees to the need of these aspects of sovereignty, he refuses to divide them. Locke, on the other hand, demonstrates that a ‘division of labor’ can very feasibly exist, especially because he touches upon the idea of a natural power that pertains to other duties. Federative power, which relates to “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions” (Locke 76), could easily be invested in entirely separate bodies from both the executive and legislative powers.
